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attending to their interests. But it is necessary only to call the executor
a fiduciary to find a duty incumbent upon him to convey the title. The
general characteristic of the fiduciary relationship is loyalty and most
authorities seem to agree that executors and trustees owe this loyalty
to their respective beneficiaries in varying degrees. It is to be hoped,
however, that enough basic differences between executors and trustees
have been pointed up to indicate that the court's language in Burmeister
was less than exact and that it would have made the court's meaning
as to the executor-legatee relationship clearer had it used the suggested
term "fiduciary" rather than adding yet another nuance to the variable
definitions of "trust" and "trustee."
FREDERICK T. OLSON
Eviction Procedure In Public Housing: While public housing
has been a fact of American life for over thirty years and countless
millions have been tenants in such projects, the case law arising out of
this relationship has been minimal. The case of Thorpe v. Housing
Authority of the City of Durham,' vacated and remanded in 19672 and
decided in January, 1969, represents the Supreme Court's first con-
sideration of a controversy founded on this relationship.
The Thorpe family moved into their home in the Durham Housing
Project on November 11, 1964.4 Residents of the project, according
to a standard lease used in federally assisted housing projects, are
month-to-month tenants with the lease providing for automatic re-
newal for one month periods. The lease may be terminated by either
party with at least fifteen days notice prior to the end of the month.
On August 10, 1965, Joyce Thorpe was elected president of a tenants'
organization in the project. On the following day she received notice
that her lease was being terminated as of August 31, 1965. No ex-
planation was given for the termination. 5
Through her attorneys, Joyce requested a hearing to determine the
reasons for the termination of the lease. The hearing was denied and
no reasons were given. The Thorpe family's holdover prompted the
Housing Authority to institute a summary ejectment proceeding in
the Justice of the Peace Court. In a motion to quash the action it was
argued that Joyce was being deprived of her constitutional rights and
189 S. Ct. 518 (1969).
2 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
3 For a complete discussion of public housing and many of the problems al-
luded to in this article, see Rosen, Tenants' Rights in Public Housing,
HOUSING FOR THE POOR: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, Project on Social Welfare
Law, Supplement No. 1 (1967).
4 For a detailed statement of the facts, see Douglas' concurring opinion in the
first Thorpe case, 386 U.S. 670, 674 (1967).
5 "All apparently went well for eight months; the record reveals no complaint
from the manager of the housing project." Thorpe v. Housing Authority
of the City of Durham, 386 U.S. 670, 674 (1967).
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that due process was not being afforded because she was not granted
a hearing nor informed of the reasons prompting the eviction. The
motion was denied and the court ordered the Thorpe family to move
out. On appeal to the superior court and a trial de novo, the court af-
firmed the eviction, holding that Mrs. Thorpe was not evicted because
of her activities in the tenant organization, and that the Housing Au-
thority was not required to provide a hearing, nor specify the reasons
for the lease termination. On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme
Court, the eviction was affirmed. The court held that the tenant's
rights are governed by the lease and that it was "immaterial what may
have been the reason for the lessor's unwillingness to continue the
relationship as landlord and tenant .... "1
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on December
5, 1967.7 On February 7, 1967, while the case was pending, the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a cir-
cular which directed federally assisted housing projects to inform
their tenants of the reasons for a lease termination prior to the ter-
mination, and to provide a method by which a tenant might reply and
offer explanation." On the basis of this circular, the Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the North Carolina Supreme Court and re-
manded the case to that court in light of the HUD circular. On re-
6267 N.C. 431, 433, 148 S.E.2d 290, 292 (1966).
7385 U.S. 967 (1966).
sThe text of the circular is as follows:
Subject: Termination of Tenancy in Low-Rent Projects
Within the past year increasing dissatisfaction has been expressed
with eviction practices in public low-rent housing projects. During
that period a number of suits have been filed throughout the United
States generally challenging the right of a Local Authority to evict
a tenant without advising him of the reasons for such eviction.
Since this is a federally assisted program, we believe it is essential
that no tenant be given notice to vacate without being told by the
Local Authority, in a private conference or other appropriate man-
ner, the reasons for the eviction, and given an opportunity to make
such reply or explanation as he may wish.
In addition to informing the tenant of the reason(s) for any pro-
posed eviction action, from this date each Local Authority shall
maintain a written record of every eviction from its federally as-
sisted public housing. Such records are to be available for review
from time to time by HUD representatives and shall contain the
following information:
1. Name of tenant and identification of unit occupied.
2. Date of notice to vacate.
3. Specific reason(s) for notice to vacate. For example, if a tenant
is being evicted because of undesirable actions, the record should
detail the actions which resulted in the determination that eviction
should be instituted.
4. Date and method of notifying tenant with summary of any
conference with tenant, including names of conference participants.
5. Date and description of final action taken.
The Circular on the above subject from the PHA Commissioner,
dated May 31, 1966, is superseded by this Circular.
s/ Don Hummel
Assistant Secretary for Renewal and 'Housing Assistance
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mand, the North Carolina Court held the HUD circular did not apply
to the facts of the Thorpe case because "all critical events took place
months before"9 the date of the circular.
The United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari, 10 and
in the second Thorpe case reversed the North Carolina Court, holding
that federally assisted housing projects must apply the HUD circular
"before evicting any tenant still residing in such project on the date
of this decision."'" The Court held the circular to be mandatory on
all federally assisted housing projects, and a valid exercise of HUD's
rule making power." The Court stated that the circular did not usurp
the responsibility of local authorities in the administration of projects,
and because it was "reasonably related to the enabling legislation under
which it was promulgated,"'13 the circular was not an unconstitutional
violation of the annual contract existing between the Durham Housing
Authority and HUD.
The basic approach to evictions in public housing projects prior
to the Thorpe decision was based on the premise that there was no
distinction between public and private landlords. This philosophy was
formulated in Brand v. Chicago Housing Authority14 where a federal
court of appeals upheld the right of the Housing Authority to ter-
minate the lease of several tenants. The court reasoned that the tenants'
right of possession was limited by the terms of the lease, and that the
lease is binding on the tenants "in the same manner as though the
lessor had been a private person rather than a governmental agency."'15
This has been the standard tack of state courts when confronted
with the issue.1 6 Courts have repeatedly stated that the only relevant
9271 N.C. 468, 471, 157 S.E.2d 147, 149 (1967).
10 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
"'Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 89 S. Ct. at 522. Execu-
tion was stayed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina so the Thorpe fam-
ily was still residing in the project when this case was decided.
12United States Housing Act of 1937, § 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1408 (Supp. III, 1967).
13 89 S. Ct. at 525. See United States Housing Act of 1937 § 1, as amended
by Housing Act of 1948, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
14 120 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1941).
15 Id. at 788. The court relied on Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579
(1934), for the proposition that "When the United States enters into contract
relations its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law
applicable to contracts between private individuals." See also United States
v. Blumenthal, 315 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1963) for support of the Brand doctrine
although Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Authority, 29 App. Div. 2d 338, 288
N.Y.S.2d 159 (1968), distinguished Blumenthal from the cases dealing with
public housing. Blumenthal dealt with a lease termination by the government
of surplus land which the lessor was using commercially. "Low rent housing
is not the leasing of government-owned property originally acquired for a
different purpose, but now surplus or not required for that purpose, on a
sporadic or temporary basis . . . where the traditional notions of private
property might well be applied; . . ." Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Au-
thority, supra, 29 App. Div. 2d at 341, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 163.16See, e.g., Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Simpson, 85 Ohio
App. 73, 83 N.E.2d 560 (1949), noted in 6 J. OF HouSING 150 (1949); San
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consideration is whether the housing authority has terminated the oc-
cupancy in compliance with the lease. Since reasons for termination
are not necessary in the private sphere, 7 state courts, true to the Brand
philosophy, have not required them of public landlords.'
This thinking was modified, unfortunately only temporarily, in the
mid-fifties by a series of cases following the passage of the Gwinn
Amendments.' Tenants in federally assisted housing projects were
required by the Gwinn Amendment to sign oaths disclaiming member-
ship in a list of subversive organizations. In striking down attempted
evictions by housing authorities, courts repeatedly relied on Frost
and Frost Trucking Company v. Railroad Commission0 for the proposi-
tion that a state may not condition a privilege, which it may deny
altogether, on the surrender of constitutional rights. 2' In Peters v. New
York Housing Authority,22 the court, in prohibiting an eviction be-
cause of a tenant's failure to sign such a disclaimer, held the Gwinn
Amendment to be constitutionally defective in that it imposed "an
unconstitutional requirement as a condition for occupancy in low rent
housing projects.123
[T]he government is under no duty to provide bounties in the
form of low rent housing accommodations for its citizens. If
it elects to do so, however, it cannot arbitrarily prevent any of
its citizens from enjoying these statutorily created privileges.
Nor can it make the privilege of their continuance dependent
on conditions that would deprive any of its citizens of their con-
stitutional rights. A government is without power to impose an
Diego State College Foundation v. Hasly, 90 Cal. App. 2d 884, 202 P.2d 868
(1949) ; Walton v. City of Phoenix, 69 Ariz. 26, 208 P.2d 309 (1949).
'
7 Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968) stands as a limitation on a
private landlord's freedom to terminate a tenancy. The court held that a
private landlord may not terminate a tenancy in retaliation against a tenant
who reports housing code violations. Contra, Hoyt v. La Chance, reported
in 14 WELFARE L. BULLErIN 11 (Conn. Cir. Ct., 14th Cir at Hartford, 1968).
IsSee, e.g., Chicago Housing Authority v. Ivory, 341 Ill. App. 282, 93 N.E.2d
386 (1950), noted in 7 J. OF HouSING 432 (1950).
19 ". . no housing unit constructed under the United States Housing Act of
1937, as amended, shall be occupied by a person who is a member of an
organization designated as subversive by the Attorney General." Act of
July 5th, 1952, Ch. 578, 66 Stat. 403, re-enacted by Act of July 31, 1953, Ch.
302, 67 Stat. 307, formerly 42 U.S.C. 1411(c), repealed, Act. of Sept. 25,
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3672, 73 Stat. 681.
20271 U.S. 583 (1926).21 See also Hannegan v. Esquire Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) ; Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in his concurring opinion in American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 417 (1949) stated: "This is so not because Congress
in affording a facility can subject it to any conditions it pleases. It cannot.
Congress may withhold all sorts of facilities for a better life but if it af-
fords them it cannot make them available in an obviously arbitrary way or
exact surrender of freedoms unrelated to the purposes of the facilities."
See Comment, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595 (1960).
229 Misc. 2d 942, 128 N.Y.S2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1953), inodified, 283 App. Div.
801, 128 N.Y.S.2d 712 (2d Dept. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 307 N.Y. 519,
121 N.E.2d 529 (1954), appeal dismissed on remand, 1 App. Div. 2d 694, 147
N.Y.S.2d 859 (2d Dept. 1955).
239 Misc. 2d at 957, 128 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
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unconstitutional reqfirement as a condition for granting a privi-
lege, even though the privilege may have been the use of gov-
ernment property.24
Other courts struck down evictions because the list of organiza-
tions promulgated by the housing authorities was broader than the
Attorney General's list, and therefore the housing authority had ex-
ceeded its authority and the evictions were arbitrary, and a denial of
due process.2 5 In Kutcher v. Housing Authority the New Jersey Court
stated that:
[T]he Authority cannot act arbitrarily for, unlike private
landlords, it is subject to the requirements of due process ...
Due process and equal protection of the laws means equality of
treatment under like circumstances and conditions both in the
privileges conferred and the burdens imposed. These constitu-
tional principles secure the individual against the arbitrary ex-
ercise of the powers of government.26
Courts also invalidated evictions on the basis that the housing
authority did not have the right to exact the signing of such a dis-
claimer because such actions did not bear a reasonable relation to the
purposes of public housing. In a Wisconsin case Lawson v. Housing
Authority for the City of Milwaukee,28 the plaintiff-tenant refused to
sign a disclaimer of membership, and challenged the constitution-
ality of the Amendment. The Housing Authority argued that it
stands in the same position as a non-governmental landlord, and that
tenants have no vested right which permits them to raise the issue of
unconstitutionality. To this argument, the court responded:
The holding out of a privilege to citizens by an agency of gov-
ernment upon condition of non-membership in certain organi-
zations is a . . . subtle way of encroaching upon constitutionally
protected liberties .... If a precedent should be established, that
a governmental agency whose regulation is attacked by court
action can successfully defend such an action on the ground that
the plaintiff is being deprived thereby only of a privilege, and
not of a vested right, there is extreme danger that the liberties
of any minority group in our population, large or small, might
be swept away without the power of the courts to afford any
protection. 29
The court struck down the resolution adopted to implement the Gwinn
Amendment as an unconstitutional deprivation of first amendment
24 Id. at 942, 128 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
25 See. e.g., Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
2620 N.J. 181, 119 A.2d 15 (1955).27 See Housing Authority v. Cordova. 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215 (App.
Dept. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956); Chicago Housing Authority
v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 (1954). See also Note, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 551 (1956).
28270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955).
:29 Id. at 275, 70 N.W.2d at 608, 609.
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rights stating: "This court deems the possible harm which might result
in suppressing the freedoms of the First Amendment outweigh [sic] any
threatened evil...., 0
The cases decided after the Gwinn Amendment controversy indi-
cated that courts, with some exceptions, 3' refused to apply the holdings
in the Gwinn cases and limit the governmental landlord to a permis-
sible scope of action in dealing with public housing tenants. Up to the
time of the second Thorpe case, the termination of a tenant's lease
absent reasons was considered permissible conduct on the part of the
housing authority.31 This reasoning was the basis for a recent dismissal
in Circuit Court, Milwaukee County, of an action brought by tenants
challenging an eviction from a moderate income housing project.33 The
court held that a failure to provide a hearing prior to the termination
of the lease was not a violation of due process or Wisconsin Statutes
66.40-.404, and that the housing authority is not required by statute to
terminate a lease on only reasonable grounds.
Although the first Thorpe case left the legal effect of the HUD
circular uncertain,34 it was nonetheless effective in altering the think-
ing of some courts. In Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Authority,
a New York court, while stating that the HUD circular did not apply
to the controversy because the project was state financed, held never-
theless that:
[A] housing project authority cannot arbitrarily deprive a ten-
ant of his right to continued occupancy through the exercise of
a contractual provision to terminate the lease. In other words,
action of the Housing Authority must not rest on mere whim or
caprice or an arbitrary reason.
3
-
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the second Thorpe case was
the fact that it resolved the questionable legal effect of the circular. It
was the position of the Durham Housing Authority that the circular
was only advisory due to the circular's precatory statement "we be-
3o Id. at 287, 288, 70 N.W.2d at 615.
3' A notable exception is Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Au-
thority, 266 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Va. 1966). The court found that a tenant's
lease was terminated because he was active in organizing other tenants in
the project. With only cursory reference to the first Thorpe case, the court
struck down the eviction as a deprivation of first amendment rights.32 See, e.g., Housing Authority of Pittsburgh v. Turner, 201 Pa. Super. 62,
191 A.2d 869 (1963). Housing Authority v. Venezie, 25 Beaver Co. L.J. 92
(Pa. C.P. 1963). For a very recent reliance on the Brand doctrine, see
Chicago Housing Authority v. Stewart, 40 Ill. 2d 23, 237 N.E.2d 463 (1968).
33Peterson v. Housing Authority of Milwaukee, No. 359-141 (Cir. Ct., Mil-
waukee County) dismissed August 20, 1968, reported in 15 WELFARE L. BUL-
LETIN 19 (1968).
34 Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in the first Thorpe case, 386 U.S.
at 681, expressed doubt as to the legal effect of the circular. ". . . the status
of the circular, whether a regulation or only a press release, is uncertain.
.. " See also Chicago Housing Authority v. Stewart, 40 Ill. 2d 23, 237 N.E.2d
463 (1968).
3529 App. Div. 2d 338, 341, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159, 163 (1968).
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lieve it is essential.13 6 The Court, through analysis of a prior circular3 7
and in view of the fact that the agency intended the circular to be an
addition to the Low-Rent Management Manual,3" held that it was the
intention of HUD that the circular be mandatory on all federally as-
sisted housing projects.3 9
In holding the circular to be mandatory, the Court has taken an
important step in dissolving the public-private equation. No longer
can courts hold that the duties of public landlords vis-a-vis tenants are
the same as private landlords. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opin-
ion in the first Thorpe case, urged the Court to be more explicit in
differentiating the public landlord from his private counterpart.40 He
stated that the actions of governmental landlords are circumscribed by
the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment. Douglas quoted
from Rudder v. United States to underscore his point. "The govern-
ment as landlord is still the government. It must not act arbitrarily,
for unlike private landlords, it is subject to the requirements of due
process."41 While the Housing Authority in Thorpe conceded "that its
power to evict is limited at least to the extent that it may not evict a
tenant for engaging in constitutionally protected activity,"' ' the value
of the second Thorpe case would have been enhanced if the Court had
followed Douglas' suggestion in the first Thorpe case and been more
explicit as to the "permissible range of state action against the indi-
vidual." 43
If the Court had been more detailed as to the scope of non-action
by a public landlard, would this have unreasonably tied the hands of
housing authorities in dealing with tenants? Douglas, in the first Thorpe
case, felt that such an approach would not leave the public landlord
powerless. Douglas suggested that evictions would be proper if a
36 See note 8 supra.
37 The previous circular stated: "We strongly urge, as a matter of good social
policy .. " This circular was not incorporated into the Management Manual.
38 Pursuant to HUD rule making power under United States Housing Act of
1937, § 8, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1408 (Supp. III, 1967).
39 Following the decision in the first Thorpe case, when the effect of the cir-
cular was uncertain, the Project on Social Welfare Law, as reported in 8
WELFARE L. BULLETIMN 4, 5 (1967), queried the Chief Counsel of HUD,
Joseph Burnstein, as to how HUD would enforce the circular assuming it
to be mandatory on the local housing authorities. He stated: "In light of
the experiences we have had in dealing with local authorities during the
past 30 years, we expect that they will comply with the provisions of this
Circular or endeavor to do so in good faith. In general, where instances of
noncompliance with provisions of the Annual Contributions Contract have
occurred, our established policy has been to seek a full exchange of views
in order to remove any misunderstandings and to achieve voluntary com-
pliance if at all possible. In very rare instances have we found it necessary
to exercise our rights under Sections 501-502 to take title to or possession
of the project or under Section 508 to exercise other available remedies."40 Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 386 U.S. at 678 and 679.
41226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
42 Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 89 S. Ct. at 526.
43Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 386 U.S. at 681.
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tenant's conduct, such as failure to follow reasonable regulations, im-
paired the smooth operation of the project. "Evictions for such reasons
will completely protect the viability of the housing project without
making the tenant a serf who has a home at the pleasure of the man-
ager of the project or the housing authority." 4
The argument was made in both Thorpe cases, as it has been made
in a long line of cases,4 5 that housing authorities must grant the tenant
a hearing that complies with due process prior to a lease termination.
The Supreme Court refused to deal directly with this issue in the
second Thorpe case," but intimated that if housing authorities did not
grant a hearing, a tenant's remedy would be to holdover and challenge
the reason for termination in the ensuing eviction proceeding. Con-
sonant with this approach was Douglas' question in the first Thorpe
case. "Is there a constitutional requirement for an administrative
hearing, where, as here, the tenant can have a full judicial hearing
when the authority attempts to evict him through judicial process?"47
This position places an unwarranted amount of faith in the eviction
proceeding. With the poor service of process which is prevalent in
urban areas,48 often the first notice that a tenant receives of the eviction
is when the sheriff arrives to dispossess. Because most eviction pro-
ceedings are summary in nature 9 and not an ideal forum to raise the
issues of arbitrariness or unconstitutionality, tenants have been re-
quired to take the initiative and attempt to prevent the eviction through
injunction or declaratory judgment. Since the HUD circular requires
the housing authority to provide the tenant with "an opportunity to
make such reply or explanation as he may wish,"50 and because courts
have found it unnecessary to require a hearing prior to termination,51
HUD should require, through an additional circular, an appropriate
hearing in order to effectively implement the February 7 circular.
4Id. at 680.
45 See, e.g., Chicago Housing Authority v. Stewart, 40 Ill. 2d 23, 237 N.E.2d 463
(1968); Williams v. Housing Authority of Atlanta, Civ. Action No. 10796
(N.D. Ga. 1967).
48The Court stated: "We do not sit, however, 'to decide abstract, hypothetical,
or contingent questions . . . or to decide any constitutional question in ad-
vance of the necessity for its decision. . . .'" Thorpe v. Housing Authority
of the City of Durham, 89 S. Ct. at 527, quoting from Alabama State Fed-
eration of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1965).47Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 386 U.S. at 678.4 8 LE BLANC, LANDLOnD-TENANT PBOPLEMS, IN THE EXTENSION OF LEGAL
SERVICES TO THE POOR, 51-60 (U.S. Dept. of H.E.W. 1964).
49 See Wis. STAT. Ch. 291 (1967); Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. River Realty
Co., 248 Wis. 589, 22 N.W.2d 593 (1945).
00 See note 8 supra.
51 While the Court did not pass directly on the requirement of a hearing, there
is authority supporting the position that the constitutional requirements of
due process are satisfied if there is a judicial hearing before the govern-
mental action becomes final. Ewing v. Mitinger and Casselberry, Inc., 339
U.S. 594 (1950); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Hager v.
Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701 (1884).
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While both Thorpe cases were decided on non-constitutional grounds,
the Court has nonetheless, in holding the HUD circular to be manda-
tory, taken an essential step in protecting the rights of public housing
tenants. Specifying reasons for termination will implicitly restrict the
housing authority from terminating the lease on unconstitutional or
arbitrary grounds. The tenant, thus armed with the reasons for the
termination, will be on firmer ground in challenging the termination
than the pre-Thorpe tenant who was not entitled to the reasons for
the termination. The Thorpe case is but a small step, but it does mirror
a growing body of thought, starting with the philosophy of Frost52
and the cases decided under the Gwinn Amendment, that tenants in
public housing, and recipients of all forms of government largesse are
not constitutional nonpersons.5 3 Hopefully, in the near future, with an
appropriate case before it, the Supreme Court will be more explicit in
defining the rights and duties of landlords and tenants in public
housing.
THOMAS M. PLACE
52291 U.S. 583 (1926)
53 See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. Riv. 733 (1964); Fortas, Equal
Riohts-For Whom?, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 401 (1967).
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